Abstract
Social choice theory is concerned with developing and evaluating voting systems, both for the use of political and organizational elections and for use as decision making process for multiagent systems. Particularly in the context of multiagent systems, computational resistance to various types of control has become a desired property of a voting system. Though manipulative actions may always be possible, strong computational barriers to efficient control can give us sufficient confidence in the integrity of an election. Range Voting is a natural extension of approval voting that is resistant to a large number of cases of control. In particular, the variant Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number of control resistances among natural voting systems.
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Elections--Mathematical models; Voting--Mathematical models; Social choice--Mathematical models; Multiagent systems
Publication Date
2009
Document Type
Thesis
Department, Program, or Center
Computer Science (GCCIS)
Advisor
Hemaspaandra, Edith
Recommended Citation
Menton, Curtis, "Range voting is resistant to control" (2009). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
https://repository.rit.edu/theses/326
Campus
RIT – Main Campus
Comments
Note: imported from RIT’s Digital Media Library running on DSpace to RIT Scholar Works. Physical copy available through RIT's The Wallace Library at: JF1001 .M46 2009