Abstract
As the world grows more and more reliant on microcomputing systems, security becomes a greater and greater concern. Malicious code is an ever-present issue in the field of computing and hardware vulnerabilities pose a rising threat to an increasingly connected landscape. This variety in threats can be mitigated through invariant rules for device operation, which form a policy for acceptable device behavior such that policy violations can be interpreted as either erroneous or malicious. This defense architecture disregards threat source and identifies issues based on their symptoms. Such systems are usually enforced through hardware implementations, which can become expensive in time and resources to include and even more so to adapt or modify. To address this, a software-based anomaly detector system was designed and implemented on an STM32-l476rg microcontroller. This system enforces a set of custom security invariants through software and included device peripherals, allowing anomaly detection without modifying the device. These invariants were developed over the course of the work based on listings from the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) from the MITRE corporation. The detector consists of a secure bootloader to ensure code integrity, a detector system making use of general-purpose and watchdog timers, and a FreeRTOS instance to run the overlying user code. This system was tested against simulated hardware anomalies through the debug port and measured for performance. The detector was able to successfully detect a variety of threats, including out-of-bounds execution, locked memory modification, stack overflow, improper state transition, hardware reconfiguration, debug mode use, secure boot bypass, and AES round skips. The detector code was found to have a processor time overhead of 0.0842 percent, and the memory usage reached about four percent utilization for the target processor.
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Computer security--Software; Computers--Defects; Debugging in computer science
Publication Date
12-2023
Document Type
Thesis
Student Type
Graduate
Degree Name
Computer Engineering (MS)
Department, Program, or Center
Computer Engineering
College
Kate Gleason College of Engineering
Advisor
Michael Zuzak
Advisor/Committee Member
Roy Melton
Advisor/Committee Member
Marcin Lukowiak
Recommended Citation
Thomas, Jacob, "Software-Based Property Enforcement for Detecting Hardware Anomalies" (2023). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
https://repository.rit.edu/theses/11627
Campus
RIT – Main Campus
Plan Codes
CMPE-MS
Comments
This thesis has been embargoed. The full-text will be available on or around 12/22/2024.