In the aftermath of the United States Presidential election, more and more frequently there are calls for voters to be able to place their votes from the comfort of their own home. However, many studies have found prototype systems to be either insecure or insufficiently defined for the purposes of an election on a national scale.

In this paper I will examine the security of voting applications from a different angle: the validation and verification of compiled code. There are the obvious concerns about unverified code, that we have no guarantee the protocol described by the voting procedure is the one being executed. Using work by Appel [3] as a model, it can be seen that even advanced cryptographic algorithms can be verified. Using Chaum’s scheme, a visual cryptography system intensely examined in Staub’s work [1], and originally described in Chaum’s paper [5], as our target enables us to have a secure algorithm that we can properly verify. Our goal will be to establish a verified code implementation for Chaum’s scheme that could be deployed to voters to confirm their votes.

Library of Congress Subject Headings

Electronic voting--Security measures; Voting--Technological innovations; Computer security

Publication Date


Document Type


Student Type


Degree Name

Computer Science (MS)

Department, Program, or Center

Computer Science (GCCIS)


Matthew Fluet

Advisor/Committee Member

Edith Hemaspaandra

Advisor/Committee Member

Stanisław Radziszowski


Physical copy available from RIT's Wallace Library at JF1032 .S38 2017


RIT – Main Campus

Plan Codes