Abstract
With the rapid expansion of the Internet of Things and rising concerns over intellectual property protection, hardware security has become increasingly vital—particularly in defending against hardware trojans. While much of the existing research targets digital trojans, analog hardware trojans remain largely unexplored, presenting unique opportunities for developing innovative attack vectors and mitigation strategies. This thesis introduces a novel all-analog temporal trojan that functions entirely within the analog domain. The design incorporates power supply noise detection and charge-accumulator techniques to enable precise control over attack execution and payload delivery. It also leverages novel circuit techniques to reduce power and area overhead, enhance concealment, and increase resilience to process variations and accidental triggering. The system is implemented in a 55 nm CMOS process and validated through simulation, physical layout, and silicon fabrication, with post-silicon testing and mitigation studies planned. The functionality of the Trojan is demonstrated within an analog front-end for ECG-based biometric authentication, showcasing its potential to corrupt analog data streams while evading standard detection methods. The goal of the trojan is two-fold: to demonstrate the wide-reaching and disruptive potential of analog trojans, and to motivate the development of robust defenses against such stealthy and persistent threats.
Library of Congress Subject Headings
Internet of things--Security measures; Hardware Trojans (Computers); Electric power; Electronic noise; Analog electronic systems
Publication Date
4-2025
Document Type
Thesis
Student Type
Graduate
Degree Name
Electrical Engineering (MS)
Department, Program, or Center
Electrical and Microelectronic Engineering, Department of
College
Kate Gleason College of Engineering
Advisor
Tejasvi Das
Advisor/Committee Member
Michael Zuzak
Advisor/Committee Member
Eric Bohannon
Recommended Citation
Ramos-Brito, Roberto, "An Ultra-Low-Power, Area-Efficient All-Analog Trojan with Temporal Power Supply Triggering" (2025). Thesis. Rochester Institute of Technology. Accessed from
https://repository.rit.edu/theses/12153
Campus
RIT – Main Campus
Plan Codes
EEEE-MS
Comments
This thesis has been embargoed. The full-text will be available on or around 5/29/2026.